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LENITY ON ME: LVRC HOLDINGS LLC V. BREKKA 
POINTS THE WAY TOWARD DEFINING 
AUTHORIZATION AND SOLVING THE SPLIT 
OVER THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
Warren Thomas∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
According to one recent survey, almost 60% of employees who 
leave their jobs take company data with them.1 Indeed, technological 
advances have made it easier than ever for employees to walk out the 
door with confidential information:2 “The digital world is no friend to 
trade secrets.”3 Companies’ data loss prevention programs have 
struggled to keep up with such advances during the current economic 
downturn.4 In recent years, employers have increasingly filed 
lawsuits using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)5 to 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Mark 
Budnitz and Aaron Danzig for their time and input, and thanks to my wife Lindsay for her love and 
encouragement. 
 1. PONEMON INSTITUTE LLC, DATA LOSS RISKS DURING DOWNSIZING 3 (2009), 
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/Data%20Loss%20Risks%20During
%20Downsizing%20FINAL%201.pdf; Brian Krebs, Data Theft Common by Departing Employees, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/26/ 
AR2009022601821.html (summarizing the report’s findings).  
 2. Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 
IDEA 359, 361 (2009) (comparing the traditional thief who might steal company information by 
“back[ing] up a tractor-trailer truck to the office in the dead of night and load[ing] up several boxes” and 
the “new ways . . . to perform the same task . . . [because] [t]oday’s thief could simply walk out with the 
information on his digital music player [or] . . . e-mail the information to its intended destination”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRIAL BY FIRE: WHAT GLOBAL EXECUTIVES EXPECT OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY—IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WORLD’S WORST ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IN THIRTY 
YEARS 14–15 (2009), http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/information-security-survey/pdf/ 
pwcsurvey2010_report.pdf (finding over forty percent of survey respondents believe security incidents 
are more likely “due to employee layoffs and risks associated with business partners and suppliers 
weakened by the downturn”); accord PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing increased data 
loss risks during the recession). 
 5. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). “Technically speaking, . . . [the] acronym CFAA refer[s] only to 
the 1986 amendments. In practice, however, courts and commentators use both labels to refer to the 
entire federal unauthorized access statute . . . .” Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting 
“Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1598 n.11 (2003) 
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punish employees who absconded with company data and to deter 
further abuses.6 
The CFAA defines several violations that include access “without 
authorization” as a necessary element for the plaintiff to allege and 
prove. For example, the statute creates liability for “[w]hoever . . . 
intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, 
and as a result of such conduct causes damage and loss.”7 Many cases 
ultimately turn on whether the former employees accessed their 
computers without authorization or in excess of authorization.8 
However, the statute does not define authorization9 and “[c]ourts 
have struggled over how to interpret the provisions of the CFAA” in 
the context of employer litigation over employees’ misappropriation 
of data.10 The landscape of conflicting opinions is so treacherous that 
one court recently suggested it was relieved that it “need not parse 
through the complex issues” to interpret the statute.11 
A widening split among circuit and district courts over the 
meanings of without authorization and exceeds authorized access in 
the CFAA continues to cause confusion among litigants and threatens 
to improperly expose defendants to greater criminal liability if 
expansive interpretations remain unchecked.12 In 2003, Professor 
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope]. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006) provides the basis for a civil action 
in the otherwise criminal statute. 
 6. See generally, e.g., Richard Warner, The Employer’s New Weapon: Employee Liability Under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11 (2008); Graham M. Liccardi, 
Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2008); Nick Akerman, When Workers Steal Data to Use at New 
Jobs: Despite Some Negative Case Law, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is an Effective Tool for 
Employers, NAT’L L. J., July 6, 2009, at 18. 
 7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(C) (West Supp. 2010). 
 8. See discussion infra Parts II–III. 
 9. See generally § 1030. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006) (defining exceeds authorized access in 
terms of the undefined authorization). 
 10. ES & H, Inc. v. Allied Safety Consultants, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-323, 2009 WL 2996340, at *2 
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2009). 
 11. Id. at *3–4 (finding the plaintiff’s inadequate allegation of “loss” dispositive and dismissing the 
CFAA claims). 
 12. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1598–99 (discussing the “uncertain scope” of 
unauthorized access statutes as it applies to contracts between computer owners and users granted 
authorized access). 
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Orin Kerr13 worried about the implications of an increasingly broad 
scope of conduct found to violate the CFAA: “These precedents have 
arisen in the civil context, and have not yet been applied to criminal 
cases. . . . [B]road judicial interpretations of unauthorized access 
statutes could potentially make millions of Americans criminally 
liable for the way they send e-mails and surf the Web.”14  
In 2008, federal prosecutors confirmed Kerr’s fear when they 
brought criminal charges against Lori Drew in the wake of the tragic 
suicide of Megan Meier.15 The government alleged Ms. Drew 
accessed MySpace servers “without authorization and in excess of 
authorized access” when she violated the MySpace terms of the 
service agreement.16 Although the court ultimately dismissed the 
case,17 some commentators suggested the prosecutor’s “novel and 
extreme” interpretation of the CFAA set an alarming precedent.18 
Indeed, a district court adopted the broad view of authorization—
previously only applied in civil cases and the subject of vigorous 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Kerr is a faculty member of the George Washington University Law School. GW Law Faculty 
Directory, http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=3568 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
 14. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1599. 
 15. For a detailed profile of Megan Meier and the story of her death, see Lauren Collins, Friend 
Game: Behind the Online Hoax That Led to a Teen’s Suicide, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2008, at 34, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa_fact_collins. Essentially, Lori 
Drew and her daughter created a fictitious MySpace profile in violation of the site’s terms of service. 
Posing as “Josh,” they befriended and then later harassed Megan. She ultimately hung herself in her 
bedroom. 
 16. Indictment at 9, United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (CR08-00582), 2008 
WL 2078622.  
 17. See generally Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (granting defendant’s post-verdict motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the misdemeanor CFAA violation because it contravenes the “void-for-vagueness” 
doctrine); Kim Zetter, Cyber Bullying Case Officially Dismissed for Vagueness, WIRED, Aug. 31, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/lori-drew-ruling. The U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a notice of 
appeal in September 2009, although it subsequently dropped the appeal. Orin Kerr, Government Files 
Notice of Appeal in Lori Drew Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2009, 7:52 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2009/09/25/government-files-notice-of-appeal-in-lori-drew-case (referencing 
Professor Kerr’s own work on the case: he represents the defendant); Orin Kerr, Justice Department to 
Drop Lori Drew Appeal, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2009, 7:51 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2009/11/19/justice-department-to-drop-lori-drew-appeal. 
 18. Kim Zetter, Experts Say MySpace Suicide Indictment Sets ‘Scary’ Legal Precedent, WIRED, May 
15, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/05/myspace-indictm. Others have praised the 
prosecution, however. Kim Zetter, Congresswoman Praises Lori Drew Prosecutors, WIRED, July 1, 
2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/congresswoman-praises-lori-drew-prosecutors 
(quoting Rep. Sanchez’s statement that she “applaud[s] the work of the U.S. attorneys who have worked 
hard to bring Ms. Drew to justice” and highlighting her sponsorship of a “cyberbullying” prevention 
bill). 
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debate19—and allowed the first criminal prosecution against a former 
employee charged with unauthorized access of his company’s data in 
the twenty-five year history of the CFAA.20 These cases illustrate the 
importance of resolving the question of when access is unauthorized. 
This Note examines the debate over the nature of unauthorized 
access in the context of the maturing circuit split. Part I provides an 
overview of the CFAA and introduces the cause for disagreement. 
Part II discusses the development of the split of authority interpreting 
without authorization under the CFAA and focuses on the milestone 
cases in the debate. Part III analyzes the recent Ninth Circuit case, 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,21 and its disparagement of 
International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,22 the Seventh 
Circuit’s prior influential interpretation. Part IV evaluates several of 
the interpretive methods courts have used to reach their conclusions 
and finds them unsatisfactory to resolve the question. Finally, Part V 
proposes that courts should interpret the CFAA in light of the rule of 
lenity to arrive at a narrow construction and definition of 
unauthorized access.  
I.  BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE CFAA 
The CFAA is “by far the most important and influential computer 
misuse statute in the United States”23 and serves “as the centerpiece 
of federal enforcement efforts related to computer-based crimes.”24 
As computer use increased in the 1970s and 1980s, so did computer 
misuse.25 Law enforcement agencies needed new criminal laws that 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Compare Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of 
authorization), with Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 
BUS. LAW. 1395 (2006–2007) (arguing for a broader “reasonable person” test of authorization). 
 20. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 
2009) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and stating the court was “[un]persuaded by Nosal’s 
arguments or by the narrower view of ‘authorization’”). 
 21. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 22. International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 23. Winn, supra note 19, at 1402. 
 24. A. HUGH SCOTT & KATHLEEN BURDETTE SHIELDS, COMPUTER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CRIME: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 4-3 (Cumulative Supp. 2006). 
 25. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1602. 
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were better suited to fight the emerging computer crimes,26 and 
Congress responded by passing the initial version of the CFAA in 
1984, which applied only to federal government computers.27 
Congress amended the CFAA several times since its initial 
passage.28 Subsection (a) defines seven substantive criminal offenses, 
and these offenses have been modified over the years.29 In 1994, 
Congress added subsection (g)30 to give a civil cause of action for 
“victims who suffer specific types of loss or damage as a result of a 
violation[] of the Act,” thus creating compensatory damages and 
injunctive or other equitable relief.31 Amendments in 1996 and 2001 
broadened the statute to protect essentially all computers used in 
interstate communication.32 
Many of the CFAA offenses require a prosecutor or plaintiff to 
show that a defendant “accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access” to create liability for 
such conduct.33 Congress defined exceeds authorized access as 
                                                                                                                 
 26. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ccmanual/01ccma.pdf [hereinafter COMPUTER CRIMES]. 
 27. SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 24, at 4-8 to 4-9. Between 1978 and 1999, every state enacted its 
own computer crime statute as well. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1615. 
 28. The most recent update re-designated several subsection identifiers within § 1030. Identity Theft 
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, tit. II, § 204, 122 Stat. 3560, 3561–63. 
The provisions that are the focus of this Note are “substantially similar, albeit now codified [as] different 
provisions.” ES & H, Inc. v. Allied Safety Consultants, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-323, 2009 WL 2996340, at *2 
n.2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2009). Thus, to aid future readers, CFAA citations within this Note refer to the 
current version as codified in U.S.C.A. and its supplement. Further, CFAA references in cases have been 
altered (as indicated) to refer to the corresponding, current subsection. 
 29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1)–(7) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). These are: “Obtaining National 
Security Information,” “Compromising the Confidentiality of a Computer,” “Trespassing in a 
Government Computer,” “Accessing a Computer to Defraud & Obtain Value,” “Causing Damage to a 
Protected Computer,” “Trafficking in Passwords,” and “Extortion Involving Threats to Damage a 
Protected Computer.” COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 26, at 2; see also SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 
24, at 4-4.  
 30. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXIX, § 290001, 108 Stat. 
2097. 
 31. COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 26, at 3; SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 24, at 4-11.  
 32. SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 24, at 4-3 (citing the definition of protected computer as it existed 
in 2006). Today the CFAA includes computers “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2010). 
 33. COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 26, at 4–5 (illustrating authorization requirements in tabular 
format). Only the crimes dealing with unauthorized damage, trafficking in passwords, and extortion lack 
an element of authorized access. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (a)(6), (a)(7). Additionally, Professor 
Kerr notes that “most statutes start with the basic building block of ‘unauthorized access’ to computers, 
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follows: “to access a computer with authorization and to use such 
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser 
is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”34 However, definitions of access 
and authorization are notably absent.35 While the meanings of both 
terms are open for debate,36 this Note deals only with the 
interpretation of authorization.37 
II.  REVIEW OF PAST CASE LAW INTERPRETING AUTHORIZATION 
From the leading case of United States v. Morris38—“one of the 
first prosecutions under the CFAA”39—to the full-blown circuit split 
present today,40 judicial interpretation of authorization has changed 
dramatically. In Morris, the Second Circuit held that the defendant 
gained unauthorized access to computer systems when he used a 
program for something other than the program’s “intended 
                                                                                                                 
and then add additional elements to the offense to deal with specific types of computer misuse.” Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1616 (discussing both state and federal statutes). 
 34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6) (West 2000) (emphasis added).  
 35. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1623–24. Professor Kerr calls this a “mystery.” Id. at 
1597. He also points out that only one state, Michigan, attempted to define without authorization, and he 
criticizes its statute as potentially unconstitutional. Id. at 1624 n.110. 
 36. See generally Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5 (discussing the development of 
unauthorized access statutes and various interpretations of both access and without authorization). 
 37. Other authors and courts discuss the meaning and construction of access under the CFAA and 
other unauthorized access statutes. See, e.g., Role Models Am., Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 
(D. Md. 2004) (“‘[A]ccess’ in this context, is an active verb: it means ‘to gain access to,’ or ‘to exercise 
the freedom or ability to make use of something.’” (quoting Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., 
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1272 (N.D. Iowa 2000))), quoted in SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 24, at 
4-16; State v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848, 852–53 (Kan. 1996) (construing Kansas statute’s definition of access 
narrowly); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2232–34, 2253–58 
(2004) (arguing that “the narrower reading of ‘access’ is . . . the more natural one,” where access refers 
to “conduct by which one is in a position to obtain privileges or information not available to the general 
public”); Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1619–21, 1624–28, 1646–48 (analyzing various 
interpretations, including those in Allen and America Online, and proposing a broad construction of 
access); Susan Brenner, “Access,” CYB3RCRIM3 (Feb. 12, 2006, 2:28 PM), 
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2006/02/access.html (noting it is “surprising . . . that there [is] relatively 
little case law” defining access and citing State v. Allen as a leading case).  
 38. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 39. Winn, supra note 19, at 1406. 
 40. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to adopt the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of without authorization). 
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function.”41 Today, two primary lines of diverging case law compete 
to either expand or narrow the meaning of authorization.42 
Despite the criminal background of the CFAA, the amendments 
adding a civil cause of action and expanding the definition of 
“protected computer” quickly led to many more civil cases than 
criminal prosecutions.43 Perhaps for this reason—“the context of civil 
disputes rather than criminal prosecutions”44—courts expanded the 
interpretation of authorization to cover more conduct than before: “It 
is one thing to say that a defendant must pay a plaintiff for the harm 
his action caused; it is quite another to say that a defendant must go 
to jail for it.”45 Thus, the problem lies in the fact that judicial 
interpretations that broadened civil liability under the CFAA have 
also broadened criminal liability.  
The most common fact pattern deals with employee data theft: an 
employee decides he will leave his employer to join a competitor and 
uses the employer’s computer systems to take data useful to his new 
pursuit.46 The former employer discovers the data leak and files suit 
under the CFAA, alleging the employee used the company’s 
computers “without authorization.”47 It is within this context that 
                                                                                                                 
 41. SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 24, at 4-17 (citing United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510 (2d 
Cir. 1991)). Professors Kerr and Winn both theorize that “the intended function test appears to derive 
largely from a sense of social norms in the community of computer users.” Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, 
supra note 5, at 1632; accord Winn, supra note 19, at 1406 (noting that the “system of unwritten 
norms . . . established between the users of the network” conscribed Morris’s authorization). 
 42. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *5 (listing cases and 
summarizing the positions); Condux Int’l, Inc. v. Haugum, No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 5244818, 
at *4 nn.3–4 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2008) (same). 
 43. Winn, supra note 19, at 1408; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 
6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7 n.11 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (“[T]he CFAA has 
largely been addressed in the civil context . . . .”). 
 44. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1641. 
 45. Id. at 1641–42 (“Courts are more likely to hold a defendant liable under an ambiguous statute 
when the stakes involve a business dispute between two competitors than when the government seeks to 
punish an individual with jail time.”). 
 46. Orin Kerr, Lori Drew, Take 2?: The Government’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Prosecution 
in United States v. Nosal, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 25, 2009, 2:03 AM), 
http://volokh.com/2009/02/25/lori-drew-take-2-the-governments-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-
prosecution-in-united-states-v-nosal [hereinafter Kerr, Take 2]. 
 47. Id. 
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courts took the first step to the “remarkable” expansion of the 
meaning of access.48 
A.  Expanding the Scope of Without Authorization: Shurgard Storage 
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.49 
In Shurgard, the plaintiff and defendant were direct competitors in 
the self-storage facilities business.50 The defendant offered a job to 
Eric Leland, a manager for Shurgard, and before leaving Shurgard’s 
employment, Mr. Leland “sent e-mails to the defendant containing 
various trade secrets and proprietary information belonging to the 
plaintiff.”51 Shurgard sued under various provisions of the CFAA, 
including §1030(a)(2)(C), which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] 
a computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, 
and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected 
computer.”52 The defendant moved to dismiss the claim because the 
plaintiff did not allege that Leland accessed the information without 
authorization.53 
The district court adopted the plaintiff’s theory, holding “the 
authorization for [Shurgard’s] . . . employees ended when the 
employees began acting as agents for the defendant.”54 This is the so-
                                                                                                                 
 48. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1632. 
 49. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 
2000). We begin with Shurgard because, according to Professor Winn, “[a]lthough a district court 
opinion, the analysis in [the case] has been very influential. Its broad reading of the CFAA has been 
followed by the majority of other courts in the United States.” Winn, supra note 19, at 1409. However, 
Kerr, in early 2009, wrote the following: 
[T]here have been about 20 district court decisions on this, about 10 of which were 
handed down in the last year alone, and the cases are divided almost 50/50 . . . between 
decisions accepting the [Shurgard] theory and decisions rejecting it. Also, there is a clear 
trend in the caselaw: The earlier decisions generally accepted this theory, and the more 
recent cases tend to reject it. 
Kerr, Take 2, supra note 46; see also infra notes 70–107 and accompanying text.  
 50. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2010). 
 53. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. The defendant’s contention was based on the fact that 
Shurgard alleged “Mr. Leland had full access” to the information and thus could not have been “without 
authorization.” Id. at 1123–24. 
 54. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1633 (omission in original) (quoting Shurgard, 119 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1124). 
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called “agency theory of authorization.”55 The court applied the rule 
from the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 112 stating, “the 
authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the 
principal, he acquires adverse interests or he is otherwise guilty of a 
serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”56 Therefore, according to 
the plaintiff, Mr. Leland “lost” his authorization and was thus without 
authorization (according to the CFAA) when he accepted the 
defendant’s job offer and chose to email the proprietary information 
to Safeguard.57 
B.  Cementing Shurgard: International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. 
Citrin58 
In the ensuing years, several district courts in various jurisdictions 
adopted the agency theory in Shurgard.59 When Judge Posner 
adopted the argument for the Seventh Circuit in Citrin and reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, its 
weight increased significantly.  
In Citrin, the defendant was an employee of International Airport 
Centers (IAC) and used a company-provided laptop to perform the 
duties assigned him.60 According to IAC’s complaint, Citrin had 
engaged in “improper conduct” before deciding to quit and form his 
own, competing business.61 He installed a “secure-erasure” program 
on the laptop and deleted all the files—data belonging to IAC—in 
such a manner as to make them unrecoverable.62 The Seventh Circuit 
held that the IAC could state a claim under the “intentionally causes 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id.; accord Warner, supra note 6, at 18; Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or 
Contract: Determining Employers’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 819, 823 (2009). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958), quoted in Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 
1125. 
 57. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
 58. Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 59. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 6, at 19 n.36 (noting the “widespread endorsement” of Shurgard 
and citing cases). 
 60. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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damage without authorization” provision.63 The court went on to say 
that Citrin violated the CFAA provision barring access without 
authorization64 as well: “[H]is authorization to access the laptop 
terminated” when he engaged in the improper conduct, decided to 
quit, and chose to delete the files, thus violating his “duty of loyalty 
that agency law imposes” on employees.65 As in Shurgard, the 
“breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship . . . 
and with it his authority to access the laptop.”66 
Arguably, this part of Judge Posner’s conclusion—that Citrin’s 
access was unauthorized—is mere dicta. The plaintiff alleged a 
violation of the CFAA provision that prohibits causing damage 
without authorization.67 Because the court only needed to reach a 
holding on the elements that comprise subsection (a)(5)(A), it was 
unnecessary to conclude Citrin terminated his agency relationship 
and authorized access by acquiring an adverse interest.68 Nonetheless, 
many courts have approvingly adopted the reasoning and authority of 
the Seventh Circuit opinion.69 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (West Supp. 2010) (creating liability for whoever “knowingly 
causes the transmission of a program . . . or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally 
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer” without requiring a showing of access 
without authorization). 
 64. See id. § 1030(a)(5)(B). 
 65. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
 66. Id. at 420–21. 
 67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A); Third Amended Complaint at 12–13, Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (No. 
03 C 8104), 2006 WL 3038522. 
 68. US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 n.3 (D. Kan. 2009) (“[T]he Citrin 
court’s reasoning might even be considered dicta, as it reached the issue in concluding that, although the 
plaintiff asserted a violation of paragraph (a)(5)(A)[] of the CFAA (which contains no authorization 
language), the alleged conduct would also violate paragraph (a)(5)[(B)]; thus, it is not clear that the 
authorization issue was fully presented to that court.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 760, 767 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding 
the defendant’s use of contrary authority “misplaced. Those courts expressly disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Citrin and adopted narrower definitions with respect to the authorization 
element . . . . This Court is bound by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Citrin.”). 
10
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C.  Stemming the Tide, Narrowing the Scope: Lockheed Martin Corp. 
v. Speed70 
However, not all courts followed Citrin. In a case in the Middle 
District of Florida with facts very similar to Shurgard, plaintiff 
Lockheed Martin Corporation alleged that a rival defense contractor 
conspired to gain an unfair advantage on bids for an Air Force 
contract.71 Lockheed alleged that three employees abused their 
“complete access” to proprietary information72 and copied data to 
compact discs and personal digital assistants before departing for 
their new employer.73 Lockheed argued that, as in Citrin and 
Shurgard, the employees terminated their agency authority and 
accessed the data without authorization when they formed the intent 
to steal the information and give it to Lockheed’s competitor.74 
However, the court was “not persuaded by the analysis in either 
Citrin or Shurgard.”75 Rather, it relied on the “plain language” of the 
CFAA to resolve the issue without resorting to “extrinsic 
materials.”76 Applying a dictionary definition of authorization, the 
court held the employees were authorized to access their computers 
and did not exceed authorization because Lockheed permitted their 
access to the “precise information at issue.”77 Thus, the court drew a 
distinction between the employees’ improper access—which would 
be actionable under the CFAA—and the employees’ improper 
actions.78 
The court provided four reasons it disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit: (1) the agency approach improperly expanded the meaning of 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 1, 2006). 
 71. Id. at *1. 
 72. Specifically, defendant Speed had “complete access,” defendant Fleming had “unrestricted 
access,” and defendant St. Romain had “access” to the files. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *4 (slyly noting that “[i]n the Eleventh Circuit, there is a 
presumption that, in drafting a statute, ‘Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’”). 
 77. Id. at *5. 
 78. Id. (“As much as Lockheed might wish it to be so, § 1030(a)(4) does not reach the actions 
alleged in the Complaint.”). 
11
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without authorization by encroaching on the distinct meaning of 
exceeds authorized access;79 (2) the interpretation encompassed a 
larger “spectrum of wrongful access” than Congress intended;80 (3) 
the agency approach “broaden[ed] the doorway to federal court” for 
employers when such intent is unclear in the statute;81 (4) the 
statutory construction did not comport with the rule of lenity, which 
would be appropriate because of the criminal nature of the CFAA.82 
The reasoning in Speed has significantly influenced subsequent 
courts. Although Shurgard and Citrin were the prevailing authority 
for a time, “more recent decisions of district courts in the federal 
system reflect an evolving analysis favoring the narrow view of the 
CFAA.”83 Many of the decisions in this trend cite Speed as 
persuasive.84 However, other persuasive authority might soon 
threaten to eclipse it. 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at *6 (“[T]he term becomes equipped with a breadth that effectively shaves ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ down to a mere sliver of what its plain meaning suggests. . . . [I]t appears that Citrin 
relegates the work performed by ‘exceeds authorized access’ . . . .”). 
 80. Id. (“Citrin slays all three heads of wrongful access when Congress only aimed at two heads. . . . 
Congress singled out those accessing ‘without authorization’ . . . and those ‘exceeding authorization’ . . . 
while purposefully leaving those in the middle untouched (those accessing with authorization), 
regardless of their subjective intent.”). 
 81. Id. at *7 (“[T]he ‘adverse interest’ inquiry affixes remarkable reach to the statute—a reach that is 
not apparent by the statute’s plain language.”). 
 82. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7 (“[T]he CFAA is a criminal statute with a civil cause of action. 
To the extent . . . [there are] ambiguous terms, the rule of lenity, a rule of statutory construction for 
criminal statutes, requires a restrained, narrow interpretation.” (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 
U.S. 349, 383 (2005))). The court also acknowledged Professor Kerr’s comment, see supra note 45 and 
accompanying text, regarding the expansive interpretations made easier in civil litigation. Id. at *7 n.11. 
 83. NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (declining, 
however, to adopt this evolving analysis); accord Kerr, Take 2, supra note 46 (“[T]here is a clear trend 
in the caselaw [sic]: The earlier decisions generally accepted [the Citrin] theory, and the more recent 
cases tend to reject it.”); Amy E. Bivins, Employers Should Revisit Data Misuse Policy In Light of Ninth 
Circuit Brekka CFAA Ruling, 8 Privacy & Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 1441, 1441 (Oct. 5, 2009) (“[The] trend 
of courts almost uniformly becoming less receptive to the CFAA as a cause of action in trade secret 
cases.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Condux Int’l, Inc. v. Haugum, No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 5244818, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Dec. 15, 2008) (“[T]he Lockheed line of cases reflects a more correct interpretation.”); Diamond 
Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (concluding that Speed 
supports “the more reasoned view”). But see NCMIC Fin. Corp., 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (noting two 
circuit courts adopted the broad view, but no circuit court had yet adopted the narrow view). 
12
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III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT RIPENS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS CITRIN 
IN LVRC HOLDINGS LLC V. BREKKA  
In September of 2009, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Citrin and opened wide the split in 
authority. As discussed above, most of the decisions interpreting the 
CFAA occurred in the district courts.85 However, until 2009, Citrin 
remained the only court of appeals holding on the matter. At least 
twenty-six district courts handed down decisions between the 
beginning of 2008 and the middle of 2009; these decisions split 
approximately even over the proper interpretation of without 
authorization.86 Moreover, district courts within the same circuit 
occasionally reached different conclusions.87  
The Ninth Circuit experienced such an intra-circuit split. Before 
2008, the Ninth Circuit was a leader in district courts broadly 
construing the CFAA: Shurgard birthed the agency theory of 
authorization,88 and several other decisions within the circuit 
followed Shurgard, Citrin, or both.89 In 2008, one court within the 
Ninth Circuit broke ranks and strongly argued for the narrow 
interpretation—relying heavily on Speed—in its “widely cited” 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See supra Part II. 
 86. Robert D. Brownstone, Privacy Litigation, in DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW: COMBATING 
CYBERTHREATS § 9:13.50 (West Supp. 2010) (noting, however, that six of the thirteen district court 
opinions favoring the broad interpretation originated in the Seventh Circuit, where Citrin is mandatory 
authority). 
 87. In one suit, a Tennessee district court narrowly interpreted the CFAA but then certified an 
interlocutory appeal so that the Sixth Circuit could resolve the intra-circuit division. Black & Decker, 
Inc. v. Smith, No. 07-1201, 2008 WL 3850825, at *3–4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2008) (finding no Sixth 
Circuit opinion interpreting the CFAA, a difference of opinion among the district courts within the 
circuit, and a split of authority outside the circuit and holding “this difference in opinion that causes the 
[c]ourt to certify this case for immediate appeal”); accord Brownstone, supra note 86, at n.5. The Sixth 
Circuit denied the plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. In re Black & Decker (U.S.), No. 08-0512, 
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21199 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 88. See supra Part II.A. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 13, 2009); ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Pac. Aerospace & 
Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (granting preliminary 
injunction and supporting the broad interpretation).  
13
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opinion.90 Finally, in September 2009, the Ninth Circuit resolved the 
difference within the circuit in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka91 and 
provided additional support for future courts that also wish to reject 
Citrin.92 
A.  Brekka: The Case and Its Reasoning 
The essential facts in Brekka resemble the familiar pattern. Mr. 
Brekka, while an employee of the plaintiff LVRC, sent several 
company documents to his personal email account.93 He subsequently 
ceased working for LVRC, though he owned and operated a 
consulting business within the same industry.94 LVRC alleged that 
Brekka committed two without authorization violations under the 
CFAA95 when he accessed the confidential information “to further 
his own personal interests.”96 
Like in Speed, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by examining 
the “plain language” of the CFAA. The court looked to the dictionary 
definition of authorization and concluded that authorization in the 
employment context equates with “permission.”97 It found “[n]o 
language in the CFAA” to suggest that an interest contrary to the 
employer would end an employee’s authorization;98 thus, because 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See generally Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008) (citing Speed 
throughout its reasoning); Bivins, supra note 83 (stating that Shamrock has been “widely cited outside 
the circuit” for its rejection of the Citrin line of reasoning). 
 91. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Bivins, supra note 83. 
 92. Jeff Neuburger, Citing Plain Language of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Ninth Circuit 
Rules Employee’s Disloyal Act Does Not Terminate Authorization to Access Employer’s Computer, 
NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG (Sept. 15, 2009, 1:32 PM), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2009/09/ 
articles/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/citing-plain-language-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-ninth-
circuit-rules-employees-disloyal-act-does-not-terminate-authorization-to-access-employers-computer 
(“The Ninth Circuit has now weighed in on the issue . . . and has taken a position diametrically opposed 
to that of an influential Seventh Circuit opinion . . . .”). 
 93. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1131; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). 
 96. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1132. 
 97. Id. at 1132–33 (relying on the “fundamental canon of statutory construction” that words should 
be interpreted according to their “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” (quoting Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))). 
 98. Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). Cf. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 
2006 WL 2683058, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (“Because the plain language of the statute is 
sufficient to interpret the disputed terms, this Court need not resort to extrinsic materials.”). 
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Brekka had permission to use his computer, his use was authorized.99 
The court further explained that the result was a “sensible 
interpretation of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4), which gives effect to both the 
phrase ‘without authorization’ and the phrase ‘exceeds authorized 
access’”—without authorization means without any permission, and 
exceeds authorized access means permission to access the computer 
but not to the information at issue.100 
The Ninth Circuit was “unpersuaded” by Citrin’s interpretation of 
the CFAA.101 However, unlike some of the cases in the Speed line,102 
the court said that the criminal nature of the statute was “most 
important” to justify its reasoning.103 First, it noted that its 
interpretation in this civil case would be “equally applicable” to a 
criminal context.104 The rule of lenity “requires courts to limit the 
reach of criminal statutes . . . and construe any ambiguity against the 
government.”105 The rule ensures that defendants have notice of what 
conduct may subject them to criminal liability.106 Thus, because of 
“the care with which [the court] must interpret criminal statutes,” it 
declined to adopt the interpretation and agency theory of Citrin.107 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133. 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *6 (“[T]he plain meaning brings clarity to 
the picture and illuminates the straightforward intention of Congress, [that is,] ‘without authorization’ 
means no access authorization and ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to go beyond the access 
permitted.”). 
 101. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134. 
 102. See, e.g., Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966–67 (D. Ariz. 2008) (turning 
“[f]inally” to the rule of lenity for construing statutes with both criminal and noncriminal applications); 
Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *6–7 (discussing criminal nature last among four justifications for 
adopting the narrow interpretation). 
 103. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134. 
 104. Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)); see also discussion infra Part V.B. 
 105. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (quoting United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006)); 
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “rule of lenity” as “[t]he judicial 
doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or 
inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment”); 
discussion infra Part V.A. 
 106. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134–35. 
 107. Id. at 1135. But cf. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (finding the argument concerning the rule of lenity “unavailing” because it is 
only applied when there exists statutory ambiguity and finding no such ambiguity in the CFAA). 
15
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B.  Brekka’s Wake 
Following the release of the opinion, some commentators 
anticipated that the time could be near for the Supreme Court to 
resolve the questions surrounding the meaning of without 
authorization in the CFAA.108 However, no petition for writ of 
certiorari was ever filed. But at a minimum, Brekka was new 
mandatory authority within the Ninth Circuit and therefore had 
important implications for two recent criminal cases in the circuit. 
The Department of Justice withdrew its appeal from the dismissal in 
United States v. Drew.109 Later, on motion for reconsideration of its 
earlier order in United States v. Nosal,110 the district court dismissed 
five counts against the defendants in light of Brekka because the 
alleged activity took place while they were still employees who had 
permission to access their employer’s systems.111  
In the civil context outside the Ninth Circuit, however, it is too 
early to say whether the decision will accelerate the “clear trend” to 
reject the agency theory of authorization and to construe the term 
without authorization more narrowly.112 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See, e.g., David Kravets, Court: Disloyal Computing Is Not Illegal, WIRED, Sept. 18, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/disloyalcomputing (“The appellate court’s decision 
Wednesday, meanwhile, sets the stage for possible review by the U.S. Supreme Court.”); Neuburger, 
supra note 92 (“No doubt more will be heard on this issue in the Ninth Circuit, and other courts as well. 
And eventually, perhaps, the U.S. Supreme Court.”). Despite this anticipation, no petition for certiorari 
was filed. 
 109. Orin Kerr, Justice Department to Drop Lori Drew Appeal, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 
2009, 7:51 PM) http://volokh.com/2009/11/19/justice-department-to-drop-lori-drew-appeal. A copy of 
the motion is posted at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/3943.pdf. 
 110. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *4, 7 (noting that, at the time, the Ninth Circuit had not yet ruled 
whether an employee who was permitted to access computer information could be liable if the employee 
subsequently acquired an improper purpose, and then holding that one could). 
 111. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 
2010) (“Quite clearly, Brekka implicates the reasoning employed by this court in initially denying 
Nosal’s motion to dismiss the CFAA charges levied against him.”). 
 112. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. But see Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall & Shaw Sales, 
Mktg., & Consulting, LLC, No. 4:08CV01683 JCH, 2009 WL 3523986, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009) 
(holding that “[u]nder the statute, the Restatement, and the reasoning of Citron [sic] and other courts”—
but without any reference to Brekka—defendants acted without authorization when they breached their 
fiduciary duty to their employer); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 
(D. Mass. 2009) (citing Brekka as an example of the narrow interpretation of “authorization” but 
viewing mandatory First Circuit authority as favoring the broad interpretation). 
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IV.  THE VARIOUS APPROACHES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
Courts have used several different techniques of statutory 
construction to interpret the CFAA. However, almost every 
interpretive method used to reach one result has also been used to 
reach the opposite. This section examines several of the common 
approaches and evaluates how well they resolve the ultimate question 
of when access is without authorization. 
A.  Plain Meaning or “Strained” Meaning? 
Several cases begin their analyses by looking to the “plain 
meaning” of unauthorized access in the CFAA but come to different 
conclusions as to what, if any, meaning they can ascertain. For 
example, in Shurgard, the court said, “[T]he unambiguous meaning 
of a statute should be the first and final inquiry unless it would lead 
to an absurd result.”113 It then proceeded to hold that the former 
employees accessed the computers without authorization because 
their authority ended when they became agents of the defendant,114 
apparently believing this construction was such an “unambiguous 
meaning.” In contrast, the Brekka court found that an interpretation of 
“authorization” based on Citrin “does not comport with the plain 
language of the CFAA.”115 These diametrically opposed viewpoints 
provide little help to decide the proper meaning of without 
authorization. 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *6 (“The court finds no ambiguity 
in the statute here.”). 
 114. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124–25 (agreeing with plaintiff’s reliance on United States v. 
Galindo, 871 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1989), for the rule that acquisition of an adverse interest terminates the 
agency relationship and authority, notwithstanding that the case post-dated Congress’s initial passage of 
the CFAA). 
 115. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Shamrock Foods 
Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“[T]he plain language supports a narrow reading 
of the CFAA. . . . The definition of [exceeds authorized access] obviates any need to revert to outside 
sources . . . .”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *4 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (“[T]he plain language of the statute is sufficient to interpret the disputed 
terms,” and the court “need not resort to extrinsic materials.”). 
17
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B.  What Did Congress Intend? 
Many cases interpreting the CFAA look to legislative history for 
clues as to Congress’s intended meaning of “unauthorized access.” 
Shurgard examined the history of the CFAA en route to rejecting the 
notion that the statute applied to only “outsiders” and not at all to 
“insider” employees.116 The court also found “dispositive” language 
in the Senate Report accompanying the 1996 amendment: 
The crux of the offense under subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), 
however, is the abuse of a computer to obtain information.  
. . . . 
. . . [I]ndividuals who intentionally break into, or abuse their 
authority to use, a computer . . . would be subject to a 
misdemeanor penalty. The crime becomes a felony if the offense 
was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or . . . any 
criminal or tortious act . . . .117 
Therefore, the Shurgard court found, the Senate Report’s emphasis 
on the purpose of the CFAA to prevent individuals from abusing their 
right to use a computer “demonstrates the broad meaning and 
intended scope” of without authorization.118 
Predictably, courts adopting the narrow interpretation marshal 
legislative history to support their conclusion as well. In 1986, 
Congress replaced the phrase “or having accessed a computer with 
authorization, uses the opportunity . . . for purposes to which such 
authorization does not extend” with the phrase “exceeds authorized 
access.”119 By doing so, its intent was to “remov[e] from the sweep of 
the statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1127–29. 
 117. Id. at 1128–29 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8 (1996)) (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. at 1129; see also NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) 
(“The legislative history of § 1030(e)(6) supports the broad view.”); Field, supra note 55, at 830 n.71 
(noting that courts adopting the broad interpretation “use legislative history to find that the CFAA’s 
scope has been broadened over time such that it reaches and can be invoked by employers”). 
 119. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 
n.12 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 
2486). 
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[person’s] access to computerized data might be legitimate in some 
circumstances, but criminal in other (not clearly distinguishable) 
circumstances that might be held to exceed his authorization.”120 One 
court interpreted this history to find that “a violation does not depend 
upon the defendant’s unauthorized use of information, but rather 
upon the defendant’s unauthorized use of access.”121 
The conflicting statements in the legislative history provide little 
help to interpret the proper meaning of without authorization. One 
author, after thoroughly examining much of the legislative history, 
determined that it “does not support a legislative preference” for any 
approach and thus “provides little authority value to the current 
debate.”122 
C.  Providing Access to Federal Courts Versus Shutting the Door 
Courts illustrate another inherent tension that results from the 
different interpretations of without authorization. The choice either 
provides a forum to resolve these employer-former employee 
disputes in federal court or potentially relegates them to state court. 
At one point, there was a clear trend to increase access to the federal 
courts for injured employers. First, the broad, agency-based approach 
of Shurgard and Citrin necessarily increased the opportunities for 
aggrieved plaintiffs to sue under the CFAA.123 Additionally, the 
Third Circuit in 2005 expanded the scope of violations for which 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 21 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2494–95) 
(second alteration in Werner-Masuda retained but emphasis omitted). 
 121. Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2007); see also 
Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Thus, the legislative history 
confirms that the CFAA was intended to prohibit electronic trespassing, not the subsequent use or 
misuse of information.”); Field, supra note 55, at 830 n.71 (noting that courts adopting the narrow 
interpretation often argue that legislative history supports them). 
 122. Field, supra note 55, at 830–31. But see Winn, supra note 19, at 1416 (“Based on the language of 
the CFAA and its legislative history . . . the breadth of the holdings in the unauthorized access cases . . . 
appears to be consistent with Congressional intent.” (emphasis added)).  
 123. See Linda K. Stevens & Jesi J. Carlson, The CFAA: New Remedies for Employee Computer 
Abuse, 96 ILL. B.J. 144, 144, 161 (2008) (noting the expanded universe of potential litigants and 
“powerful federal cause of action” the CFAA offers); Warner, supra note 6, at  
12–13 (noting the “recent expansion of liability under the CFAA” and that the CFAA “puts another 
arrow in the employer’s quiver, and the new arrow is proving increasingly popular”). 
19
Thomas: Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward D
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
398
plaintiffs could bring a civil action under the CFAA.124 The court 
rejected the argument that the reference to the conduct factors in 
subsection (a)(5)(B)125 precluded relief for violations of the other 
sections.126 By clarifying that plaintiffs could allege other violations 
and obtain relief, the Third Circuit added to employers’ opportunities 
to allege CFAA violations in federal court.127 
On the other hand, courts favoring the narrow interpretation of 
without authorization hesitate to expand federal jurisdiction. In 
Shamrock, the court feared that conferring a federal cause of action 
whenever an employee “accesses the company computer with 
adverse interests” would “open the doorway to federal court [too] 
expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language 
of the CFAA.”128 Under this view, it is unlikely Congress intended to 
criminalize breach of contract claims,129 and jurisdiction is further 
limited by requiring “integral” use of a computer in the perpetuation 
of the wrong.130 
These common analytical approaches yield conflicting 
interpretations of the CFAA and prove ineffective to guide future 
litigants.131 One court may conclude the plain meaning of without 
                                                                                                                 
 124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West Supp. 2010); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & 
Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 125. At the time, § 1030(a)(5)(A) encompassed the three violations of what is now subsection (a)(5); 
the conduct factors in § 1030(a)(5)(B) are now codified in § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V). 
 126. P.C. Yonkers, 428 F.3d at 512 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims fit “squarely within the class 
of claims” eligible for relief). 
 127. See also Liccardi, supra note 6, at 182–89 (noting that any of the six causes of action in the 
CFAA can be used to litigate trade secret disputes in federal courts and arguing that the CFAA is an apt 
vehicle to provide federal question jurisdiction to employers). 
 128. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (D. Ariz. 2008) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 129. Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 
13, 2007). 
 130. Id. (noting that under the broad interpretation, “turning over information to a competitor would 
be a violation of the CFAA if obtained from a computer but not, for example, from a wastebasket, even 
though the defendant was permitted to access the information in the computer”). 
 131. Indeed, the broad interpretations of the CFAA and employers’ use of it resemble the “results-
oriented” use of traditional trespass and burglary laws to prosecute computer misuse before the passage 
of the CFAA. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 1605. As Kerr points out, this resulted in “little 
ex ante guidance . . . and liability depended on ex post assessments of whether the computer misuse 
caused enough of a harm to be considered theft.” Id. at 1613.  
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authorization encompasses access after a serious breach of loyalty,132 
while another may conclude the plain meaning only refers to initial 
permission to access.133 Courts may find persuasive legislative 
history to support either the broad interpretation134 or the narrow.135 
Some courts favor permitting more claimants access to federal 
courts,136 while others refuse access without more explicit 
congressional direction.137 Given these conflicts, the question 
remains—Is there a way to interpret the statute to resolve the dispute? 
V.  PROPOSAL: APPLYING THE RULE OF LENITY TO BREAK THE TIE 
With apologies to Chief Justice Marshall, we must never forget 
that it is a criminal statute we are expounding.138 Because the CFAA 
creates both civil and criminal liability for violators,139 courts should 
apply principles of strict construction of criminal laws to interpret the 
statute. As this Note has discussed, several courts interpreting the 
CFAA have already referred to the rule of lenity to justify their 
conclusions.140 In the absence of any congressional resolution of the 
problem,141 this Note proposes that courts, and potentially the 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1124–25 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 133. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 134. See, e.g., Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1128–29. 
 135. See, e.g., Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965–66 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 136. See, e.g., P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 
504, 512 (3d Cir. 2005); accord Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(reversing district court dismissal and reinstating suit under the broad interpretation). 
 137. See, e.g., Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 138. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget that it 
is a constitution we are expounding.”). 
 139. In fact, many courts recite that it is “primarily” criminal. E.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 
581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[M]ost important, [the CFAA] is primarily a criminal 
statute . . . .”); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009); EF 
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 n.8 (1st Cir. 2001); Lewis-Burke Assocs., LLC 
v. Widder, 2010 WL 2926161, at *5 (D.D.C. July 28, 2010) (noting that a court must interpret both 
criminal and civil applications consistently); Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (“[T]he CFAA is a 
criminal statute focused on criminal conduct. The civil component is an afterthought.”).  
 140. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 141. Congress could add a definition of without authorization to clarify its intent. See Stacy Nowicki, 
Ph.D., No Free Lunch (or Wi-fi): Michigan’s Unconstitutional Computer Crime Statute, 13 UCLA J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 33–41 (2009) (providing draft definitions of authorization and exceeding authorized access 
that would likely make disloyal employee conduct unauthorized), http://www.lawtechjournal.com/ 
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Supreme Court, should apply the rule of lenity to serve as a 
“tiebreaker”142 to resolve the circuit split. This section provides a 
brief overview of the lenity doctrine and explains why and how it 
applies to interpret the phrase without authorization in the CFAA. 
A.  Strict Construction of Criminal Statutes143 
“What does a court do . . . if, after careful analysis, the meaning of 
a statute remains uncertain?”144 According to the traditional canons 
of construction of criminal laws, the answer is to narrowly construe 
them to favor the defendant.145 The doctrine of strict interpretation of 
criminal laws, or the rule of lenity, is a court-evolved doctrine146 that 
dates at least to eighteenth century England,147 and it was applied in 
the United States as far back as 1820.148 
One author expressed the rule of lenity as follows: “[T]he language 
you have used in this criminal statute does not convey a clear 
intention to cover the case before us. Therefore this man, who may 
well have done something that all of us would like to treat as 
criminal, must go free.”149 Another author suggested that the rule is 
“a principle, not for reading statutes, but for limiting or prescribing 
the court’s creative functions in cases where the quest for true 
                                                                                                                 
articles/2009/01_091026_nowicki.pdf. However, one commentator suggests Congress’s inaction may 
demonstrate its “intent to grant judicial discretion” to courts to interpret authorization in the CFAA. 
Field, supra note 55, at 838–41. 
 142. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 48 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that the lenity 
doctrine is merely a “tie breaker”). 
 143. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 88 (4th ed. 2003). 
 144. DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 48 (introducing the rule of lenity).  
 145. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 191 (2007); accord 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“The rule of lenity 
requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”). 
 146. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 (1968); id. at 93 (“[T]he 
canon of strict construction has a lengthy common law history.”). 
 147. POPKIN, supra note 145, at 191; accord LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 88 (stating the rule 
developed at a time when many minor crimes were punishable by death). 
 148. Note, The New Rule Of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006) (“Chief Justice Marshall 
described it as ‘perhaps not much less old than construction itself.’” (quoting United States v. 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820))).  
 149. PACKER, supra note 146, at 95. 
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meaning has met an impasse.”150 Similarly, the Supreme Court said 
that when there are “two rational readings of a criminal statute, one 
harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when 
Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.”151 Thus, lenity 
weighs in favor of a narrow interpretation.152 
One author uses McBoyle v. United States153 to illustrate the 
principle.154 In McBoyle, the defendant was convicted for 
transporting a stolen airplane under a statute that barred transport of a 
stolen “motor vehicle.”155 The defendant surely knew he was 
committing some sort of “wrong”—the airplane was in fact stolen—
but the question was whether this was a wrong proscribed by the 
statute. In an “affirmation of the values inherent in the principle of 
legality,”156 the Court declined to extend the statute to cover aircraft 
“upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very 
likely broader words would have been used.”157 Such construction of 
statutes may have the added benefit of encouraging the legislature to 
use “sufficiently precise” language.158 
However, the rule of lenity is a limited rule.159 First, it is usually 
only applied as a last resort to interpret a statute.160 The Supreme 
Court also said that “[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing 
                                                                                                                 
 150. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 210 (1975) (emphasis 
added). Compare this “limiting” principle to the Shurgard and Citrin courts’ importation of agency 
principles into the context of the CFAA. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 151. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 383 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see also DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 48. 
 152. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 153. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
 154. PACKER, supra note 146, at 95. 
 155. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 25–26. 
 156. PACKER, supra note 146, at 95. The doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutes is one of 
the two “devices . . . [that] keep the principle of legality in good repair.” Id. at 93. 
 157. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27. 
 158. PACKER, supra note 146, at 95; see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) 
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“This venerable rule [of lenity] . . . places the weight of inertia upon the 
party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in 
Congress’s stead.”). 
 159. DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 48 (observing that some courts “strictly construe the lenity 
doctrine itself.”).  
 160. Id. (qualifying when the rule comes into play as “only” if there “truly is a ‘tie’”); see also The 
Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 475, 475 (2008) (“[W]hen a statute is 
irreconcilably ambiguous, the tie goes to the defendant.”). 
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everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than 
a guess as to what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must 
conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.”161 Thus, 
the doctrine does not apply to an unambiguous statute.162 Further, the 
rule should not be “carried to extremes” by using it to give a statute 
the “narrowest meaning” or an “overstrict [sic] construction.”163 
Finally, some commentators suggest the rule’s influence has waned 
in recent years.164 
B.  Strict Construction in Civil Contexts? 
The rule of lenity is not limited to purely criminal statutes or 
criminal prosecutions.165 In United States v. Thompson/Center Arms 
Co., the Supreme Court applied the rule to interpret civil tax 
provisions in the National Firearms Act because failure to comply 
with the act could subject a defendant to criminal liability.166 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (internal quotations, omissions, and 
citations omitted); see also United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (“The rule of lenity, 
however, applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left 
with an ambiguous statute.”). Of course, the “traditional canons” that “aid” a court in determining 
Congress’s intent include looking to the plain meaning of the words in the statute, divining the intent of 
the legislature through legislative histories, and using all “appropriate means and indicia, such as the 
purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, 
the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, . . . statutes in pari materia, the 
preamble, the title, and other like means.” DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 47–48 (quoting In re Banks, 
244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (N.C. 1978)) (internal quotations omitted). These are some of the same guideposts 
courts have used to interpret the CFAA. See supra Part IV.  
 162. For example, in Nosal the court refused the defendant’s request to apply the rule of lenity when 
interpreting the CFAA because it found “no ambiguity in the statute here.” United States v. Nosal, No. 
CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). 
 163. LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 89 (citations omitted).  
 164. E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 110 (5th ed. 2007) 
(“Today, the lenity doctrine often is not applied.”); POPKIN, supra note 145, at 192 (2007) (“As the 
[twentieth] century wore on . . . the lenity canon lost considerable force . . . . But judicial or statutory 
rejection of the rule of lenity might only mean rejecting a strong presumption . . ., leaving a somewhat 
weaker presumption in tact.”). See generally Note, The New Rule Of Lenity, supra note 148 (arguing 
throughout that, while “not defunct,” the Supreme Court has adopted a “narrower rule of lenity de facto” 
requiring strict construction “only when a broad interpretation would penalize ‘innocent’ conduct”). But 
see The Supreme Court, 2007 Term, supra note 160, at 475–76 (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
“began reversing the contraction of lenity and revitalizing a crucial protection for defendants” in United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008)). 
 165. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 386 (1st 
ed. 2006). 
 166. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 507, 517–18 (1992) (Souter, J., 
plurality opinion). Although the opinion garnered only three votes, a full majority of five justices 
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Moreover, in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court narrowly 
interpreted the term crime of violence in the Immigration and 
Nationalization Act.167 Although the case arose in a civil deportation 
case, the Court explained that “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute 
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or 
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”168 This is correct 
because it would be an absurd result for a single statutory provision 
to have two separate meanings depending on the context of the court 
proceeding.169 
C.  Strict Construction of Without Authorization in the CFAA 
Courts should apply the rule of lenity to narrowly interpret the 
term without authorization in the CFAA. First, the CFAA meets the 
“threshold requirement”170—it is primarily a criminal statute.171 Next, 
there exists the requisite amount of ambiguity that cannot be resolved 
by traditional canons of construction.172 Despite some courts’ 
statements otherwise, there is no plain meaning of without 
authorization.173 The legislative history proves inconclusive to aid 
interpretation because, within it, there are multiple instances 
supporting either construction.174 Nothing else in the text of the 
CFAA or outside of it provides significant help to understand what 
Congress actually intended by the term.175 Therefore, the arguments 
                                                                                                                 
applied the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing that application of the statute was “sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the rule of lenity” but 
“disagree[ing] with the plurality, however, over where the ambiguity lies”). 
 167. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
 168. Id. at 12 n.8. 
 169. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (“It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s 
ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though 
other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation. The lowest 
common denominator, as it were, must govern.”); see also Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 5, at 
1599 (noting the “usual rule that civil precedents apply to criminal cases” (citing United States v. 
Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 948 (5th Cir. 1987))). 
 170. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 165, at 386. 
 171. See supra note 139. 
 172. See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 165, at 386. 
 173. See supra Part IV.A. 
 174. See supra Part IV.B. 
 175. See supra note 161. 
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for either a narrow or a broad interpretation essentially balance each 
other out—it is a “tie” in need of breaking.176 
Not all courts agree that this tie exists and the rule of lenity applies 
to the CFAA. In a criminal case, United States v. Nosal, the court 
refused to apply the rule because it found “no ambiguity in the 
statute.”177 Thus, the court possessed “ample authority . . . to permit 
criminal actions to proceed based on violations of [the CFAA] by 
employees, as interpreted by civil cases.”178 Although the court 
found no ambiguity, this Note has demonstrated that there is in fact 
sufficient, irreconcilable ambiguity in the text. 
The Ninth Circuit provided the better analysis in Brekka. In 
rejecting the broad agency theory and applying the rule of lenity, the 
court considered the notice afforded the defendant and the criminal 
nature of the statute: 
If the employer has not rescinded the defendant’s right to use the 
computer, the defendant would have no reason to know that . . . 
breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would 
constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA. It would be 
improper to interpret a criminal statute in such an unexpected 
manner. . . . 
[G]iven the care with which we must interpret criminal statutes 
to ensure that defendants are on notice as to which acts are 
criminal, we decline to adopt the interpretation of “without 
authorization” suggested by Citrin.179 
Like in the example case of McBoyle,180 the “wrong” in Brekka 
was not clearly proscribed by the statute such that the defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (reasoning that when there is “no more 
reason to think” one interpretation is better than another, “the tie must go to the defendant”). 
 177. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 
2009). 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 153–58. 
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would know his conduct could be criminal.181 It makes no difference 
that Brekka involved a civil suit; the same allegation brought by the 
federal government would subject the defendant to criminal liability. 
Thus, the principles embodied in the rule of lenity give the benefit to 
the defendant and require a narrow interpretation. 
Other courts also point to this same concern and use the rule of 
lenity as a tool to reach a narrow interpretation. In Speed, the court 
noted that “[t]o the extent ‘without authorization’ . . . can be 
considered [an] ambiguous term[], the rule of lenity . . . requires a 
restrained, narrow interpretation.”182 Similarly, in Shamrock, the rule 
of lenity “guide[d] the Court’s interpretation” to weigh in favor of the 
narrow approach and reject any broad interpretation based on agency 
principles.183 Moreover, in the criminal prosecution of Lori Drew, the 
court favorably noted that the rule of lenity “ensures fair warning by 
so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to 
conduct clearly covered” before holding that the government’s 
CFAA charge was unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.184 
Finally, applying the rule of lenity to interpret the CFAA does not 
violate any of the other common limits to the doctrine. The rule is 
hardly “carried to extremes” or “overstrict” by its application here to 
limit the use of the federal courts as a forum for trade secret 
                                                                                                                 
 181. However, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Brekka in a case where the defendant was more clearly 
engaged in a crime. In United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010), an account manager at 
Citigroup used her system access to take customer account data, intending to use the data to incur 
fraudulent charges on the accounts. Id. at 269. The Fifth Circuit thought it neither improper nor 
unexpected to interpret exceeds authorized access to encompass a limit on use:  
An authorized computer user “has reason to know” that he or she is not authorized to 
access data or information in furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme. Moreover, 
[Brekka’s] reasoning at least implies that when an employee knows that the purpose for 
which she is accessing information in a computer is both in violation of an employer’s 
policies and is part of an illegal scheme, it would be “proper” to conclude that such 
conduct “exceeds authorized access” within the meaning of § 1030(a)(2). 
Id. at 273. 
 182. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 1, 2006); see also US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 nn.3, 5 (D. Kan. 
2009). 
 183. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966–67 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 184. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 463–64 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)) (emphasis added). 
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litigation.185 While it is fair to say that the defendants in many of 
these cases have wronged their former employers,186 this does not 
automatically grant plaintiffs entry into federal court. Rather, even if 
denied a CFAA claim, plaintiffs have many legal options in state 
courts to recover against former employees who misuse information: 
breaches of contract or non-disclosure agreements, misappropriation 
of trade secrets, conversion, and violations of intellectual property 
rights.187 Indeed, many plaintiffs prefer to sue in federal court under 
the CFAA because they believe it lowers the burdens of pleading and 
proof compared to state employee non-compete and trade secret 
laws.188 Thus, no equitable principles are offended by a narrow 
construction that bars plaintiffs from taking advantage of an 
“effective tool”189 that Congress never explicitly created. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress initially enacted the CFAA to provide federal prosecutors 
with a tool to combat the growing threat of computer hackers.190 
Since the addition of a civil cause of action, however, businesses 
have used the statute as another “arrow in the . . . quiver”191 of their 
data loss prevention programs. The increased litigation led some 
courts to expand the statute’s reach by broadly interpreting access 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 186. Moreover, courts assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ claims because most decisions are decided at 
pleading or summary judgment phase. E.g., Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 962.  
 187. Bivins, supra note 83; accord Warner, supra note 6, at 12–13 (stating that employers may sue for 
trade secret misappropriation or breach of contract). 
 188. Elizabeth A. Cordello, Commentary: Split over Unauthorized Use Remains, DAILY 
REC. (Rochester, N.Y.), Nov. 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23220555 (“Aside from obtaining 
federal jurisdiction, the CFAA also is an attractive means to pursue former employees in non-compete or 
trade secret litigation because employers do not have to show the existence of an employment 
agreement, or that the disputed information is confidential.”). See generally Liccardi, supra note 6 
(discussing barriers plaintiffs face litigating complex trade secret cases in state courts and how a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA overcomes some of those barriers). 
 189. See generally Akerman, supra note 6 (arguing that the CFAA remains an “effective tool” against 
employees who misuse their employers’ data). 
 190. Bellia, supra note 37, at 2256 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8–12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694–97) (“Congress clearly sought to target hacking activities. The House Report 
accompanying the statute stressed both governments’ and businesses’ growing reliance on computers 
and the threat that increased networking would make society more vulnerable to hacking incidents.”). 
 191. Warner, supra note 6, at 13. 
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without authorization to include an employee’s breach of a duty of 
loyalty to his employer. A split among the circuits ultimately 
developed over whether this is a proper interpretation of the statute. 
The split of authority over the interpretation of the CFAA presents 
a close question. Unfortunately, none of the traditional tools of 
statutory construction resolve the inherent ambiguity. Therefore, this 
Note proposes that courts should apply the rule of lenity to break the 
“tie” and narrowly interpret the statute. One court noted that the 
broad, agency-based interpretation “has its allure—it gets all of the 
wrongful accessers.”192 However, courts should recognize that “the 
criminal law’s reach is limited to . . . identifiable, discrete events.”193 
When a person acquires an “adverse interest”194 is not discrete 
enough an event to make a person subject to criminal prosecution.195 
Arguably, each of the defendants in these cases knew they were 
committing some sort of “wrong,” but this should not suffice to 
subject them to criminal prosecution where Congress has not made its 
intent sufficiently clear to impose it.196  
As Justice Scalia recently affirmed, “[T]he tie must go to the 
defendant. The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be 
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”197 The term 
without authorization in the CFAA is one such ambiguity subjecting 
individuals to criminal liability. The agency-based interpretation 
favors plaintiffs and the government rather than defendants. 
Therefore, future courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in 
Brekka, reject this agency-based interpretation, and instead apply the 
rule of lenity. The narrow interpretation of without authorization 
limits the overuse of the CFAA in criminal prosecutions and 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *6 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 1, 2006). 
 193. PACKER, supra note 146, at 97. 
 194. Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 
Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 195. See Jennifer Granick, Ninth Circuit Holds Disloyal Computer Use Is Not A Crime, DEEPLINKS 
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/ninth-circuit-holds-disloyal-computer-
use-not-crim (characterizing this as “a ‘thought crime’ interpretation of the CFAA where the employee’s 
mental state determines whether she was authorized or not”). 
 196. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 197. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
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